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Abstract
The nancial and economic conditions in emerging markets (EM) responded sharply to the
2008-09 global nancial crisis (GFC). Motivated by the lack of appropriate frameworks to
explore interlinkages between emerging and advanced economies, we propose a two-country
model with explicit trade and nancial channels. This enables us to identify the di¤erences
in the implications of domestic versus global nancial crises and explore the role of real
and nancial cross-border spillovers. We nd that (i) the interaction between the degree
of trade integration and the scale of nancial contagion; and (ii) the relative importance of
the export versus balance sheet channels play a key role in determining the overall impact
of the global nancial shock. Indeed, in the wake of the GFC, while some of the very open
EMs su¤ered substantial output losses initially, those that were able to attract the capital
owing out of the crisis-struck advanced economies recovered swiftly.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
A key feature of the 2008-09 global nancial crisis (henceforth GFC) has been the strength of
the transmission from the advanced to the emerging economies (EMs), especially during the early
phases of the crisis (see, for example, Dooley and Hutchison, 2009). Given the scale of the nancial
turmoil, a lively debate on the comparison between the GFC and the EMs past crises ensued (see,
for example, Calvo and Loo-Kung, 2010). During the previous large-scale nancial crises in EMs
notably at the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000sprivate capital inows dried up for a
substantial period of time, and output recovered only slowly despite sizable devaluations improving
export performance in many cases. In contrast, during the GFC, (i) the sharp reduction in nancial
ows to the EMs that followed from the standstill in the credit markets of developed economies
in 2008 reversed quickly; (ii) EMs witnessed a substantial fall in their exports as the nancial
turbulence hit consumer spending in the developed world. Hence, given the strong downturn in
the global economy, countries were unable to export their way out of the crisis in spite of the
substantial loss of value in their currencies. Yet, after the initial collapse, capital ows to many
EMs surged, fuelling credit expansion and hence leading to the GFC to be short-lived for many of
these economies.
The above evaluation suggests that both nancial and trade channels play a crucial role in the
propagation and transmission of domestic and global nancial shocks within and across countries.
Motivated by this observation, in this paper we develop a two-country dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model with an explicit treatment of both trade and nancial linkages between
the countries. This enables us (i) to identify, from a small open EM economy point of view,
di¤erences in the impact and policy implications of domestic and global nancial crisis scenarios;
and (ii) to explore the role of real and nancial cross-border spillovers.
There are three features of our model economy that are representative of EM economies. First,
the domestic economy exhibits nancial frictions that translate into risk premium on its external
borrowing. This has important implications for macroeconomic outcomes of a shock when a large
share of investment is nanced with external resources, as is the case for many EMs. Second, a
signicant proportion of the borrowing is taken to be in foreign currency terms, also common in
these economies.1 In the presence of such foreign currency denominated debt  widely referred to as
partial liability dollarizationthe balance sheets of the nancial system become unduly sensitive to
the changes not only in global investment patterns, but also in exchange rates. Third, and relatedly,
the costly nature of exchange rate uctuations in EMs are explicitly taken into account by utilizing
a modied Taylor rule that responds to changes in the nominal exchange rate, as widely adopted
in these economies especially during crises periods (Ghosh et al., 2016).
We take a domestic and a foreign nancial shock to represent the case of a domestic and a
1Although foreign currency denominated debt in the corporate sector has declined since the nancial turbulance
in EMs during 2000s, it does remain sizeable. For example, the share of foreign currency denominated corporate debt
as a share of total debt varies from 10% in China to 65% in Hungary, averaging around 40% for the EMs as a whole
(GFSR Database, IMF, October 2015).
2
global nancial crisis, respectively. Following the shock, lending to entrepreneurs becomes risky,
leading to a rise in the risk premium in the economy. Entrepreneurs reduce borrowing and thus
supply of capital, lowering investment and output. For the domestic economy, a global nancial
shock triggers immediate movements in trade and nancial channels: (i) the export demand of
the foreign economy shrinks (export channel), and (ii) capital inows increase as global investors
look for alternative investment opportunities (nancial substitution). However, there exists another
mechanism, which we refer to as nancial contagionin the presence of close nancial linkages
between the countries, the global shock prompts a more cautious view toward the domestic EM
economy on impact, above and beyond what could be expected based on economic fundamentals
in the model.2 Hence, under nancial contagion, foreign lenders re-price credit risk upward, and
the cost of external nancing increases, causing a sharp decline in output and domestic ination,
and a depreciation of the domestic currency.
We calibrate our two-country model to the (South) Korean and the US data and derive the
stochastic structure of our quantitative model accordingly. Koreas substantial integration with the
global economy and its major crisis experience in 1997 make it a particularly interesting example to
study domestic versus global crises in our two-country framework with explicit trade and nancial
channels. Utilizing our quantitative model, we rst show that an economys response to a global
nancial crisis is inherently di¤erent from that to a domestic one. When the economy is hit by a
domestic nancial shock, the depreciation of the currency boosts net exports, partly o¤setting the
initial decline in output. In contrast, when the nancial shock is of global origin, the reduction in the
aggregate demand in the global economy reduces demand for the home produced goods, preventing
the domestic economy to export its way out of the crisis. Second, we nd that the interaction
between the intensity of nancial contagion and the degree of trade openness plays a key role in the
transmission of the global nancial shock. In the absence of nancial contagion, the global nancial
shock triggers capital inows into the domestic economy via nancial substitution, raising the price
of domestic currency and hence reducing exports. As a result, the greater the openness, the greater
the drop in exports and thus in output. In contrast, in the presence of nancial contagion from
the global shock onto the domestic economy, the domestic economy experiences a sharp fall in
capital inows, depreciating the domestic currency, boosting exports. However, the depreciation
of the currency also worsens the balance sheet of the nancial system, given the scale of foreign
currency denominated debt. Overall, the relative importance of the export channel versus the
balance sheet channel determines the output response in the aftermath of a global nancial shock.
With greater the initial nancial leverage, the greater the endogenous rise in the risk premium
and the depreciation in the domestic economy following the global nancial shocks and hence the
greater the fall in output.
2 In this paper, we use the term nancial contagion in a rather narrow sense to refer to exogenous changes in the
perception of investors about the domestic EM economy following the global shock. This reects increased (rational
or irrational) herding behavior of international investors during times of global nancial distress. Note that even in
the absence of such nancial contagion, there are endogenous nancial transmission channels at work, a¤ecting the
nancing conditions of the domestic EM economy in the model.
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Our work in this paper is related to several strands in the literature, in particular to the growing
body of work on the international transmission of shocks in the presence of nancial frictions. A
key focus of this literature has been the nancial contagion arising from an external shock being
transmitted onto the domestic economy. Among the transmission mechanisms studied are leveraged
nancial institutions (van Wincoop, 2013); leverage constrained investors (Devereux and Yetman,
2010); binding enforcement constraints on credit supply (Devereux and Sutherland, 2011); and
global banking (Enders et al., 2011). In addition to several di¤erences regarding the modelling
choice between our paper and these studies both nancial and trade linkages are explicitly modelled
and play a key role in our work, in contrast to the studies listed above where nancial interactions
are treated as the main source of interdependence between countries.
A second strand of the related literature explored the uctuations in EMs and how nancial
frictions a¤ect the transmission of shocks onto these economies. It has been shown that nancial
frictions, through impacting the transmission of shocks, play a major role as a source of business
cycle uctuations in EMs (Chang and Fernandez, 2013). Moreover, nancial frictions have also
been shown to determine the form of optimal policy via impacting the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy (Batini et al., 2010). Our paper di¤ers from the former set of studies in their choice
of small open economy real business cycle models and their focus on business cycles uctuations; and
the latter in their focus on optimal policy. Unlike in these studies, we also explore di¤erent channels
of transmissions by examining the interactions between the trade openness, nancial leverage and
nancial contagion.
Finally, there exists a number of other studies explicitly taking up the issue of international
transmission of nancial shocks using stochastic general equilibrium frameworks. Among these
Gilchrist (2004) explores the role of leverage in the transmission of shocks from developed to
developing countries; Dedola and Lombardo (2012) study the synchronization of borrowing costs
and credit spreads across countries and Kamber and Thoenissen (2013) investigate the international
transmission of banking sector shocks. Although the former two share our two-country modelling
choice, Gilchrist (2004) examine the transmission of a positive productivity shock in the centre
country to the periphery while Dedola and Lombardo (2012) incorporate endogenous portfolio
choice and examine its e¤ects as shock propagation. The third di¤ers from our analysis in their
choice of shocks as global banking as well as the adoption of a small open economy framework.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the analytical model
structure. Section 3 extends the benchmark model to a two-country framework incorporating some
important emerging market features and describes calibration and the solution strategy. By utilizing
the quantitative model, Section 3 also considers a number of domestic versus global nancial crisis
scenarios. Finally, Section 4 provides the concluding remarks.
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2 The analytical framework
Based on the nancial accelerator mechanism developed by Bernanke et al. (1999), our sticky
price DSGE model shares its basic features with the theoretical studies incorporating the nancial
accelerator in combination with liability dollarization such as Cespedes et al. (2004). To simplify
the analysis, we assume in this part that the domestic economy is small so that foreign economy
is exogenously modelled following the small open economy (SOE) literature such as Gertler et al.
(2007).
The SOE is inhabited by innitely lived households who derive utility from consumption and
disutility from hours worked. There are three types of rms in the model. Production rms produce
a di¤erentiated nal consumption good using both capital and labor as inputs and face price
adjustment costs. Importers and exporters are perfectly competitive, with complete exchange rate
pass-through of nominal exchange rate changes to prices of imported and exported goods.3 Finally,
there are competitive rms that combine investment with rented capital to produce unnished
capital goods that are then sold to entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs play a major role in the model. They produce capital, which is rented to rms,
and nance their investment in capital through internal funds as well as external borrowing; how-
ever, nancial frictions make the latter more expensive than the former. Specically, monitoring
the business activity of borrowers is a costly activity, and hence lenders must be compensated
by an external nance premium. The magnitude of this premium varies with the leverage of the
entrepreneurs, linking the terms of credit to balance sheet conditions.
In what follows, variables with a star indicate the foreign economy variables, unless indicated
otherwise.
2.1 Households
A representative household is innitely-lived and seeks to maximize:
E0
∞X
t=0
βt
1
1− σ
(Ct −
H1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
)1−σ, (1)
where Ct is a composite consumption index, Ht is hours of work, Et is the mathematical expectation
conditional upon information available at t, β is the representative consumers subjective discount
factor where 0 < β < 1, σ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and
ϕ > 0 is the inverse elasticity of labour supply. We adopt Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences,
which eliminate wealth e¤ects from labor supply.
3Note that some of the implications of less than complete pass-through associated with local currency pricing
by exporters and importers have already been analysed by several authors (see, for example, Monacelli, 2005). We
have also examined the role of incomplete exchange rate pass-through and nd that our results are robust to this
assumption.
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The composite consumption index, Ct, is given by:
Ct =
h
(1− α)
1
γC
(γ−1)/γ
H,t + (α)
1
γC
(γ−1)/γ
M,t
iγ/(γ−1)
, (2)
where γ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods, 0 < α < 1
denotes the weight of imported goods in domestic consumption basket, and CH,t and CM,t are
consumption of domestic and foreign goods.
The real exchange rate REXt is dened as REXt =
StP ∗t
Pt
, where St is the nominal exchange
rate, domestic currency price of foreign currency, and P ∗t is the foreign price level and is normalized
to 1.
Households own all home production rms and thus are recipients of prots, Πt. Other sources
of income for the representative household are wages Wt and new borrowing net of repayments on
outstanding debt, Bt, secured at rate it−1. Hence, the representative households budget constraint
in period t can be written as follows:
PtCt + (1 + it−1)Bt =WtHt +Bt+1 +Πt. (3)
whereHt denotes the hours worked. The representative household chooses the paths for {Ct, Ht,
Bt+1 }
∞
t=0 in order to maximize its expected lifetime utility in (1) subject to the budget constraint
in (3).4
2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Production Firms
Each rm produces a di¤erentiated good using the production function:
Yt = AtNt
1−ηKt
η, (4)
where At denotes labor productivity, common to all the production rms and Nt is the labor input
which is a composite of household, Ht, and entrepreneurial labor, H
E
t ; dened as Nt = Ht
1−
HEt

.5
Kt denotes capital provided by the entrepreneur, as is explored in the following subsection.
Firms face quadratic menu costs in changing prices of domestic goods, expressed in the units
of consumption basket given by Ψ2 (
Pt
Pt−1
− 1)2.6
4We have also explored the case of household borrowing in foreign currency. We nd that this has no qualitative
impact on our results (not reported).
5 In line with much of the literature on nancial frictions we maintain the assumption of exible wages. There is
also empirical evidence pointing to wages being more exible in emerging economies than in advanced ones (see, for
example, Li, 2011). Given the dynamics of our model, relaxing this assumption would have negligible e¤ects on our
results.
6As often stated in the literature, it is possible to draw a mapping between the Rotemberg adjustment cost and
the Calvo probability of xing prices every quarter. In particular, the value of price adjustment cost could be set such
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2.2.2 Importing Firms
There is a set of perfectly competitive importing rms, owned by domestic households, who buy
foreign goods at prices P ∗X,t and then sell to the domestic market in domestic currency.
2.2.3 Unnished Capital Producing Firms
Let It denote aggregate investment in period t, which is composed of domestic and imported goods:
It =
h
(1− α)
1
γ I
(γ−1)/γ
H,t + (α)
1
γ I
(γ−1)/γ
M,t
iγ/(γ−1)
, (5)
where the domestic (IH,t) and imported investment goods (IM,t) prices are assumed to be the
same as the domestic and imported consumer goods prices, PH,t and PM,t. The new capital stock
requires the same combination of domestic and foreign goods so that the nominal price of a unit of
investment equals the price level, Pt.
Competitive rms use investment as an input, It and combine it with rented capital Kt to
produce unnished capital goods. The stock of capital evolves according to:
Kt+1 = [
It
Kt
−
ΨI
2
(
It
Kt
− δ)2]Kt + (1− δ)Kt. (6)
where ΨI denotes investment adjustment costs and δ is the rate of depreciation. The optimality
condition with respect to the choice of It yields the following nominal price capital Qt = Pt[1 −
ΨI(
It
Kt
− δ)]−1.
2.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs transform unnished capital goods and sell them to the production rms. They
nance their investment by using their own net worth and by borrowing from foreign lenders where
all borrowing is taken to be in foreign currency terms  an assumption which is relaxed in Section
3.
Each entrepreneur has access to a stochastic technology in transformingKt+1 units of unnished
capital into ωt+1Kt+1 units of nished capital goods.
7
Denoting the net worth of entrepreneurs as NWt, one can write the budget constraint of the
entrepreneur as follows:
PtNWt = QtKt+1 − StD
E
t+1, (7)
where DEt+1 denotes foreign currency denominated debt. Equation (7) simply states that capital
nancing is divided between net worth and foreign debt. It is clear that the entrepreneurs are
that linear quadratic approximation for both cases are equivalent. See Rotemberg (1982) or Lombardo and Vestin
(2009) for details.
7There is a continuum of entrepreneurs indexed by k in the interval [0,1]. Following Bernanke et al. (1999), the
idiosyncratic productivity ωt(k) is assumed to be i.i.d. (across time and across rms) with log(ωt(k)) ∼ N(
−1
2
σ2ω, σ
2
ω).
We ignore entrepreneurs index k for notational simplicity.
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exposed to exchange rate risk, that is, uctuations in the nominal exchange rate create balance
sheet e¤ects in the model.
Entrepreneurs observe ωt+1 ex post, but the lenders can only observe it at a monitoring cost
which is assumed to be a certain fraction () of the return. The contracting problem identies
the capital demand of entrepreneurs Kt+1 and a cut o¤ value, ωt+1, such that the entrepreneur
maximizes their expected return subject to the participation constraints of the lender. The resulting
rst-order conditions are:
Et[R
K
t+1] = Et[(1 + i
∗
t )(1 + Φt+1)], (8)
where RKt+1 is the return the capital and (1+Φt+1) is the external risk premium, which is a function
of entreprenurs leverage.
Net worth, NWt, evolves in the model with entrepreneurs capital net of borrowing costs carried
over from the previous period and the entrepreneurial wage:
PtNWt = ϑ[R
K
t Qt−1Ktz(ωt)] +W
E
t , (9)
where the fraction of entrepreneurs who survive each period is denoted by ϑ. Given that the bor-
rowers and the lenders share of total return should add up to 1 − νt where νt is the cost of
monitoring, we can rewrite NWt as:
PtNWt = ϑ[R
K
t Qt−1Kt(1− νt)− (1 + i
∗
t−1)StD
E
t ] +W
E
t . (10)
Note that unanticipated changes in the nominal exchange rate increase the debt burden of the
entrepreneur, and therefore decrease its net worth. This, in turn, increases the leverage of the entre-
preneur and raises the external risk premium, implying a higher cost of nancing. This additional
mechanism magnies the role of the nancial accelerator in the economy through transmitting
uctuations in the nominal exchange rate to the balance sheets of entrepreneurs.8
Because of investment adjustment costs and incomplete capital depreciation, entrepreneurs
return on capital, RKt which is the sum of the rental rate on new and used capital, and the value
of the non-depreciated capital stock, after the adjustment for the uctuations in the asset prices Qt+1
Qt

, is not identical to the rental rate of capital, Rt.
2.4 Monetary policy
In our benchmark case, we adopt a standard formulation for the monetary policy framework where
the policy interest rate responds to ination and output deviations from the steady state.
1 + it = (1 + i) (πt)
ǫπ(Yt/Y )
ǫY , (11)
8The entrepreneurs leaving the scene at time t consume their return on capital. The consumption of the exiting
entrepreneurs, CEt , is PtC
E
t = (1− ϑ)[R
K
t Qt−1Kt(1− νt)− (1 + i
∗
t−1)StD
E
t ].
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where i, and Y denote the steady-state level of nominal interest rate and output; and πt is the CPI
ination.
2.5 Benchmark model simulations
To organize the discussion, we rst present simulations from this simple framework to show the
main working of the model as well as how the impact of the shock is amplied through nancial
frictions. In this section, we examine the impact of a standard, 1% exogenous change in the risk
premium in the domestic economy. This prepares the ground for our two-country framework in the
next section that enables us to trace the transmission of a nancial shock originating in the foreign
economy onto the domestic economy. Calibrated values of the parameters are listed in Table 1 and
are discussed in detail in Section 3.
The response of the domestic SOE to the risk premium shock is presented in Fig.1. The rise in
the risk premium leads to a reversal of capital ows out of the domestic country by about 1.2% of
GDP on impact. As the cost of borrowing rises, entrepreneurs reduce their use of external nancing
by undertaking fewer projects. This decline in leverage causes a downward adjustment in the risk
premium, mitigating the initial impact of the risk premium shock. Lower borrowing, however,
decreases the future supply of capital and hence brings about a decrease in investment, in labor
demand and real wages in the economy.
The fall in capital inows also lowers the demand for the domestic currency, leading to its
depreciation. Since the entrepreneurs borrowing is denominated in foreign currency, this change in
the exchange rate also creates balance sheet e¤ects through a rise in the real debt burden, further
lowering investment and thus output in the economy. While the depreciation of the domestic
currency improves exports, it is not su¢cient to reverse the drop in output arising from the fall in
investment. Although the rise in the nominal exchange rate puts an upward pressure on the CPI
based ination, the decrease in the domestic price level more than o¤sets this e¤ect, bringing about
a fall in ination.
Overall, the model highlights two e¤ects. On the one hand, the nancial shock drags down
capital ows and hence credit growth. As a result, the currency depreciates, which further increases
the risk premium through its impact on leverage given the foreign currency denomination of the
debt. On the other hand, exports go up, which mitigates the impact of the shock, although the
post-shock output is still lower than its previous level for a prolonged period.
3 The two-country model
Given that our main interest is in the international transmission of nancial shocks onto EMs, we
now extend the above framework by incorporating some important features of these economies.
To that end we adopt (i) a two-country framework, (ii) a well-dened representation of a nancial
shock, (iii) borrowing in both domestic and foreign currency, (iv) monetary policy response to
exchange rate changes.
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First, we utilize a two-country model to (i) explicitly consider trade and nancial linkages
which are typically ignored in SOE models where the rest of the world is presented with exogenous
processes; and (ii) provide greater realism, as it allows for feedback e¤ects, which are general
equilibrium in nature. We assume that the total measure of the world economy is normalized to
unity, with domestic and foreign economies having measures n and (1 − n), respectively. In this
case, α, the share of imported goods in the consumption basket, becomes α ≡ (1−n)υ, where (1−n)
is the relative size of the foreign economy, and υ represents a degree of trade openness. Although
asymmetric in size, the domestic and foreign countries share the same preferences, technology, and
market structure for consumption and capital goods, but they di¤er in the scale of nancial frictions
and the formulation of monetary policy
Second, in our framework, the origin of a nancial shock is modelled as an unfavorable change
in the perception of investors which creates a self-fullling pessimism about the economy through
the enforcement of tighter credit conditions, similar to Curdia (2008). We argue that this better
represents the 2008-09 episode relative to the much of the existing work on the GFC and sudden
stops which typically denes the initial shock as an aggregate structural shock such as a rise in
foreign interest rates, facing individual countries. Building towards that aim, we maintain that
productivity is observed by the entrepreneur, but not by the lenders who have imperfect knowledge
of the distribution of ωt+1. Following Curdia (2008) we specify the lenders perception of ωt+1(k)
as given by ω∗t+1(k) = ωt+1(k)̺t where ̺t is the misperception factor over a given interval [0,1].
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Further, the misperception factor, ̺t, is assumed to follow ln(̺t) = ρ̺ ln(̺t−1)+ ξ ln(̺
∗
t )+ ε̺ where
ρ̺ denotes the persistence parameter, and ξ measures the degree of nancial contagion from the
foreign to the domestic economy (only relevant in the case of a global shock).
In our analysis of the nancial perception shock, we take the origin of the shock as a change
in lenders perception regarding idiosyncratic productivity (ε̺). We assume that when there is
uncertainty about the underlying distribution, lenders take the worst case scenario as the mean
of the distribution of ωt+1. Similarly, we assume that ̺
∗
t , the perception of lenders regarding the
foreign entrepreneurs productivity, follows an AR(1) process with persistence parameter ρ̺∗ and
ε̺∗ .
Third, we now move away from the limiting case of all borrowing being in foreign currency
term, as adopted in the previous section. Motivated by the relatively developed domestic debt
markets in many EMs at present, the extended model features borrowing in both domestic and
foreign currency.10
9As in Curdia (2008), our specication of the debt contract between investors and entrepreneurs explicitly takes into
account the misperception factor, which makes risk premium sensitive to the perception of investors. Curdia (2008)
adopts a max-min criteria for the misperception factor so that during the sudden stop episode, the misperception
factor is set to a constant value lower than 1. This implies that, in his calibration, the investors perception is constant
for 2.5 years at a pre-set, lower value. In our case, however, we let the misperception factor to be an AR(1) process
during the sudden stop episode such that the abrupt change in the perception of investors gradually goes back to the
pre-shock level, rather than staying constant for a prolonged period.
10Korea, which we use in our calibration, also has an advanced domestic nancial system where the share of
corporate borrowing in foreign currency remains around 20% of the total corporate debt (GFRS Database, IMF).
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Finally, we modify the Taylor rule to reect the signicance of exchange rate movements in
policy making in the EMs:
1 + it = (1 + i) (πt)
ǫπ(Yt/Y )
ǫY (St/St−1)
ǫs . (12)
where ǫs is the weight attached to exchange rate changes in setting the policy interest rate.
11
3.1 Calibration of the extended model
In this section we calibrate the extended model to the Korean and the US economies as representa-
tives of the EM and the global economy, respectively, based on the data over the period (2000-2014).
The reasons underlying our choice of Korea to represent EMs are three-fold. First, Korea is a largely
open economy, subject to global shocks due to its close nancial and trade links with the rest of
the world, which makes it a particularly interesting country to study in our setting. Second, Korea
was one of the EMs that was severely hit by the GFC, although its recovery was relatively fast.
And third, Korea had a major nancial crisis experience in 1997 alongside a number of other Asian
economies, comparable to the GFC. By analyzing Koreas adjustment to di¤erent types of nancial
crises, we seek to gain a better understanding of the transmission of global nancial shocks onto
EMs; of how they di¤er from domestic nancial crises episodes; and the key determinants of the
severity of global nancial shocks on individual countries.
The quantitative model is set at quarterly frequency.12 We maintain that the structure of con-
sumption and production is identical in the two economies and thus use the same parametrization
with the exception of the size parameter, n, which is set to 0.1 for Korea (Table 1).13 We set the
discount factor, β at 0.99, implying a riskless annual return of approximately 4 per cent in the
steady state. The inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is taken as σ = 1, which
corresponds to log utility. The inverse of the elasticity of labour supply ϕ is set to 2, which implies
that 1/2 of time is spent working. The share of capital in production, η, is taken to be 0.35. The
elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods of the same origin, λ, is taken to be 11,
implying a exible price equilibrium mark-up of 1.1, and price adjustment cost is assumed to be
120.14 The quarterly depreciation rate δ is taken to be 0.025. We set the share of entrepreneurs
labour, 
, at 0.01, implying that 1 per cent of the total wage bill goes to the entrepreneurs. The
11A number of EMs made an explicit commitment to allow the exchange rate to oat more freely when they adopted
ination targeting. However, in countries with signicant currency mismatches in domestic balance sheets, high
exchange rate pass-through to ination, and limited inter-sectoral factor mobility, ignoring exchange rate volatility
can prove costly (Ostry et al., 2012).
12 In solving the model, we rst transform it to reach a stationary representation where the steady state exists.
We then solve it numerically up to a second-order approximation around the non-stochastic steady state using Sims
(2005). The non-stochastic steady state of the model is solved numerically in MATLAB, and the second-order
approximation of the model and the stochastic simulations are computed using Dynare. Details of the computation
of the non-stochastic steady state and the stationary model equations are available upon request.
13The average nominal GDP (in U.S. dollars) of Korea over the last 15 years is about 10% of that of the US (WEO
database, IMF).
14Denoting Calvo parameter with Υ, one can express the Rotemberg adjustment cost as Ψ = (λ−1)Υ/((1−Υ)(1−
βΥ)). Given our calibrated value for Ψ, this relationship implies Υ = 0.75, a widely used value in the literature (see,
for example, Smets and Wouters, 2003 among many others).
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monitoring cost parameter, , is taken as 0.12. Regarding monetary policy, we use the original
Taylor estimates and set ǫπ = 1.5 and ǫY = 0.5, and we use ǫs = 0.1 for Korea, following Alp et al.
(2012).
In the baseline case, we set α, the share of imported goods in the consumption basket, to 0.45 to
match imports/GDP ratio in Korea. The parameter values for the entrepreneurial sector in Korea
and in the US are set to reect their dening characteristics. For Korea, we set the steady state
leverage ratio, χ, the ratio of debt to net worth, and the value of quarterly external risk premium
in the domestic economy, Φ, respectively at 0.25 and 340 basis points. For the U.S., the leverage
ratio and the risk premium are set to 0.5 and 800 basis points.15
Calibrating our model to the Korean and the US data allowed us to establish the stochastic
structure of the model accordingly. We set the size of the perception shock to reect changes in
the corporate spreads during the 1997 and the global nancial crisis (1% for Korea and 0.3% for
the U.S.). We set the persistency of the perception shock to be 0.5, so that it takes 9 quarters for
the shock to die away, as in the data.
Magnitude and persistency of the domestic and foreign productivity shocks are set to match
the volatility and the persistency of domestic and foreign output (0.7% for Korea and 1.2% for the
U.S.) and those of the terms of trade shock to match the relevant moments of the exchange rate
(0.4%).
Regarding nancial contagion, we follow Park and Song (2012) and calculate nancial contagion
as the increase in the correlation of corporate spreads during the relevant crisis episodes. Our basis
for focusing on the corporate bond spreads are two-fold. First, even though the US sub-prime
market was an important source of the shock, there is a tight connection between the housing and
corporate bond markets and hence the shock is closely reected on the corporate spreads. This can
be seen from Fig.2 displaying the time series plots of the US and Korean corporate spreads over the
period, 1999-2015. Fig.2 establishes corporate spreads as a key spill-over mechanism, as maintained
in our analysis. Second, in the literature utilizing the nancial accelerator framework, which we
borrow from, corporate bond spreads are seen as the closest approximation to the external risk
premium and are widely viewed as the relevant empirical counterparts (see, for example, Gertler
et al., 2007 and Alp et al., 2012).
To generate condence in the models ability to capture dynamics and in the proposed cali-
bration of the parameters values, we also compare movements and comovements of a set of key
variables in the data and in the model. In this analysis, in addition to the domestic and foreign
nancial shock, we incorporate domestic and foreign productivity shock, and a terms of trade shock
to represent business cycles changes.
Table 2 presents business cycle statistics in the data as well as from the simulation results from
our quantitative model. In the top panel of Table 2, standard deviations of output, investment,
15Leverage is calculated as debt as a percentage of assets from Worldscope data (data item WS 08236). We use
corporate spreads as a proxy for external risk premia, calculated as the di¤erence between 1-year AA-rated corporate
bond and Treasury yields of the same maturity from Asian Development Bank for Korea and the BofA Merrill Lynch
for the US.
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current account, ination, interest rate and exchange rate are listed, while the second panel reports
standard deviations of the same set of variables relative to the standard deviation of output. Cor-
relations with output and autocorrelations are displayed in the third panel, while the cross-country
correlations are reported in the bottom panel. In all four panels, the simulation results are based
on a contagion parameter of 0.3, calculated from the Korean data as explained above. As can be
seen from Table 2, in most cases moments from the data are well-matched by moments from the
model. The only major discrepancy is in the case of cross-country investment correlations where
the simulated correlation is much greater than that in the data. This is in line with the well-known
inability of general equilibrium models to match cross-country investment correlations (see, for
example Ambler et al. 2002 and Comin et al. 2014).
3.2 Financial shocks to domestic and global economy
We now turn to exploring the implications of nancial shocks in our two-country framework with
both trade and nancial linkages and present two alternative crisis scenarios, utilizing calibrated
values from the US and the Korean data. As opposed to the risk premium shock in our benchmark
scenario, we now consider the case of an unfavourable shift in the perception of lenders regarding
the productivity of domestic and foreign entrepreneurs, respectively, hence representing endogenous
rises in risk premia. These represent, respectively, a domestic and a global nancial crisis, arising
from a domestic nancial shock versus a global one.
Fig.3 exhibits the response of the domestic economy to the domestic and the global nancial
perception shocks, denoted by the red (thin) and the blue (thick) lines, respectively. In the former,
following the negative change in investors perception about the distribution of the entrepreneurs
productivity, lending to domestic entrepreneurs becomes more risky, leading to a rise in the ex-
ternal risk premium on impact. This case represents a more conventional, domestic-born nancial
crisis scenario in line with the Korean experience during 1997 as well as those of several EM coun-
tries during the 1990s. Similar to the mechanism in Fig.1, the rise in the risk premium reduces
the entrepreneurs demand for capital, reducing capital inows, and hence investment and output.
The reduction in capital inows reduces the demand for domestic currency, leading to its depreci-
ation. The resulting boost to competitiveness raises the foreign demand for domestic goods, while
imports decline on account of both income and exchange rate e¤ects. Hence, the trade balance
improves, but this e¤ect is not strong enough to o¤set the decline in domestic demand in our
simulations, and hence output contracts initially.16
In Fig.3, the blue (thick) line traces the transmission of a global nancial shock to the domestic
economy, with the aim of reecting the GFC experience for the EM economies. The impact of the
unfavourable nancial perception shock regarding the productivity of foreign entrepreneurs on the
foreign economy is similar to what domestic nancial shock does to the domestic economy; a rise
16 In practice, the export channel is generally highly e¤ective for countries that are hit by nancial crises and
experience a sizable loss of value of their currencies. For instance, most East Asian countries enjoyed signicant
improvements in their exports following the 1997 Asian crisis (see, for example, Bleaney, 2005).
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in the risk premium lowers borrowing and thus supply of capital, and hence investment and output
in the foreign economy.
How is the global nancial shock propagated to the domestic economy? The rst channel is
the export channel; the nancial crisis in the foreign economy reduces output and thereby import
demand in the foreign economy and thus net exports of the domestic economy. One main di¤erence
between this case of a foreign nancial shock and the domestically originated one is in the way the
export channel works. As can be seen in Fig.3, when the economy is hit by a nancial shock of
domestic origin, the depreciation of the currency brings about an improvement in net exports, which
partly o¤sets the initial decline in output. In contrast, when the nancial shock is originated in the
foreign economy, the export channel is no longer e¤ective. This is because the global nancial crisis
reduces net worth, capital, investment and output in the foreign economy, and hence its demand
for imported goods. As a result, the global nancial shock prevents the domestic economy from
exporting its way out of the crisis.
The second channel of propagation of the global nancial shock operates via a nancial sub-
stitution e¤ect. The unfavourable change in investors perception of the foreign entrepreneurs
productivity induces investors to look for alternative investment opportunities widely referred
to as ight to quality. Investors now view the domestic entrepreneurs more favourably relative to
those in the foreign economy. This leads to an increase in capital inows into the domestic economy,
partly o¤setting the impact of the rst channel, leading to the fall in capital inows to be smaller
than that under the domestic nancial shock. Overall, in our simulations the output loss under the
GFC is visibly smaller, in line with the Korean experience; Koreas GDP contracted much more
sharply in 1997 as compared with 2008.
3.2.1 Financial contagion
In addition to the export and the nancial substitution channels explored above, the global nancial
crisis is transmitted onto the domestic economy also through nancial contagion. We postulate
that investors perception regarding the true distribution of entrepreneurs productivity in the
foreign economy and the domestic economy could be inherently related. This is based on the
notion that investors choose the scale and the terms of credit they extend to borrowers in a forward
looking manner. For instance, when faced with credit tightening in the global economy, investors can
anticipate ex-ante that this will be transmitted to the domestic emerging economy through real and
nancial cross-country linkages, implying an unfavorable change in their perceptions of the domestic
entrepreneurs today. Also, some asset market linkages such as herding behavior only or mainly exist
during times of crisis (see, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000). We thus maintain that
an unfavourable (exogenous) shift in investors perception of the domestic entrepreneurs is another
channel through which the global nancial shock could spill over onto the domestic economy. In
what follows, we refer to this mechanism as the nancial contagion channel. We now turn to
exploring these channels separately.
In order to isolate the impact of nancial contagion, Fig.4 and Fig.5 present two limiting cases;
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with zero and full nancial contagion, respectively, both at di¤erent values of trade openness.
There are now two opposing e¤ects of the GFC on the domestic economy. The rst is through the
reduced exports due to the global contraction following the global nancial shock. The second, in
contrast, is a favourable impact working through increased capital inows, resulting from investors
ight to quality, leading to increased lending to domestic entrepreneurs at the expense of foreign
entrepreneurs. As is seen from Fig.4 and Fig.5 in the absence of nancial contagion, the increase
in risk premium is considerably lower and thus the contraction in output in the domestic economy
is much smaller than the one with nancial contagion. This is because when there is nancial
contagion from the global to the domestic economy, the sharp depreciation of the exchange rate
delivers an increase in exports, as is seen in Fig.5. Yet, the worsening of the risk premium and of
entrepreneurs balance sheets is much greater and thus the decline in output is much larger than
under no contagion.
3.2.2 The role of trade openness
Having established that a global nancial shock is transmitted to the domestic economy through
both the trade and nancial channels, we now turn to exploring the role of trade openness in the
propagation of the foreign nancial shock and its interaction with nancial contagion.
In our simulations the degree of trade integration is measured by v, which, together with the
size of the economy, n, determines the share of imported goods in the domestic consumption basket.
The prole of the domestic economy in both Fig.4 and Fig.5 exhibit the important role played by the
degree of trade openness in the amplication of the global nancial shock. In the case with nancial
contagion, a greater trade integration between the two countries helps alleviate the adverse e¤ects
of the global nancial crisis, similar to the case with a domestic nancial crisis (Fig.3). Under this
scenario, exports still help recover from the crisis to a certain extent because (i) the demand for
goods in the domestic economy falls even more than that in the foreign economy, and (ii) exchange
rate depreciates as capital outows surge. However, when nancial contagion is absent (Fig.4), the
global nancial shock triggers capital inows onto the domestic economy via nancial substitution,
raising the price of domestic currency and hence reducing exports; and the greater the openness,
the greater the drop in exports and thus in output. As a result, the impact of the global nancial
crisis on the domestic economy is amplied with a rise in trade openness in this case.17
The relationship between a countrys openness to trade and its vulnerability to crises attracted
a great deal of interest in the existing literature (see, for example, Calvo et al., 2006 and Claessen
et al., 2012 among many others). In the line of work exploring crises in pre-GFC period, which
typically considers domestic-born crisis scenarios, a number of studies point to openness as a feature
reducing vulnerability to crises, although others present evidence to the contrary (see, for example,
Calderon et al., 2005; Calvo et al., 2006; and Cavallo and Frankel, 2008 for the former and Glick
and Rose, 1999 and Forbes, 2004 for the latter).
In contrast, we nd that when the crisis is a global one, the more open an economy, the
17This also holds in the case of partial contagion (ξ = 0.5).
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greater the unfavorable consequences of the nancial crisis for the domestic economy pointing to
the importance of the trade channel in the transmission of international shocks. Indeed, the global
nature of the 2008-09 episode and the potentially detrimental impact of trade openness in its
transmission to individual countries has been a major focus of the empirical studies on the GFC.
There is now a large body of work, using data from the 2008-09 episode and variety of empirical
methods, that examines the role of trade openness on both the incidence and the severity of nancial
crises. Cross-country evidence suggests that countries that were more open to trade experienced
greater contractions in output, as compared with pre-crisis forecasts (Blanchard et al., 2010 and
Berkmen et al., 2012); and greater cumulative drop in output, consumption and aggregate demand
over 2008-2009 (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011). Similarly, rm level evidence also indicates that
the crisis had a greater negative impact on rms sales, prots and investment in countries that are
more open to trade (Claessen et al., 2012). 18
3.2.3 The role of nancial leverage
Finally, we examine the implications of the domestic economys initial borrowing for the severity
of a global nancial shock. We use the ratio of debt to net worth as our measure of indebtedness
the steady state value of which is taken to be 0.25 based on the Korean data.
Fig.6 displays the response of the economy to the same global nancial shock as before for
three separate values of the leverage ratio, all under no nancial contagion assumption. As can be
clearly seen from Fig.6, the greater the initial level of nancial leverage the more costly a given
global nancial shock for the domestic economy. This is because an economy with lower initial
indebtedness faces a smaller increase in the risk premium, and a greater rise in capital inows
given the absence of nancial contagion. This leads to a rise/ a smaller fall in output in the
post-crisis period as the positive balance sheet e¤ect outweighs the negative trade e¤ect brought
by a more appreciated currency. The pattern of the domestic economys response in Fig.6 is also
in line with the Korean experience of 1997 versus 2008; the more substantial output losses su¤ered
by Korea in 1997 compared to that in 2008 coincided with more unfavourable external borrowing
position in the former period relative to the latter. For example, the short term external debt as a
proportion of GDP was down from 58% in 1996-97 to 40% in 2007-08.
4 Conclusions
This paper has developed a two-country DSGE model to investigate the transmission of a global
nancial shock onto a small open emerging economy. Our framework fully species both trade and
nancial linkages between countries, enabling us to explore a number of key aspects of the recent
18Among the countries that have experienced largest falls in economic activity during the initial stage of the recent
nancial crisis have been Singapore, Taiwan and Turkey, all of which are highly open economies. The fall in output in
the rst quarter of 2009 as compared with a year earlier was 10.1, 10.2 and 13.8% for Singapore, Taiwan and Turkey,
respectively. Similarly, Germany and Japan, that are among the most open of mature economies, contracted by 6.9
and 8.8%, respectively over the same period (The Economist, July 4th, 2009).
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GFC experience that di¤ered from previous and mostly domestic-born crisis experiences in key
respects.
We nd that the response of a small open economy to a domestic nancial shock is inher-
ently di¤erent from its response to a nancial shock of global origin. We identify three separate
transmission channels through which the global nancial shock impacts on the domestic economy.
The rst is the nancial substitution channel reecting the sudden inow of capital arising from
capital owing out of the foreign economy hit by the nancial shock. The second is the nancial
contagion channel arising from the comovement in the domestic and the global nancial markets,
adversely a¤ecting the risk premium and hence capital inows. And, the third is the export channel
the size of which is determined by the relative strength of favourable nancial substitution versus
unfavourable nancial contagion e¤ects. The greater the importance of the nancial contagion rela-
tive to nancial substitution, the greater the fall in capital inows leading to a greater depreciation
and thus greater improvement in exports. Yet, such an improvement in exports is not su¢cient to
overturn the drop in output under high nancial contagion given the negative impact of higher risk
premia and the resulting depreciation of the domestic currency on the balance sheet of the nancial
system.
Our results reveal that the degree of nancial contagion, the degree of trade openness and the
degree of nancial leverage are the key determinants of how an economy is impacted by a global
crisis. We nd that it is the interaction between the degree of trade integration and the scale of
nancial contagion on the one hand, and the relative importance of the export versus balance sheet
channels on the other that determine the overall impact of the global nancial shock on domestic
macroeconomic outcomes. Indeed, the GFC provided ample examples; while some of the very open
EMs su¤ered substantial output losses initially, those that were able to attract the capital owing
out of the crisis-struck advanced economies recovered swiftly.
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Table 1: Parameter Values for Consumption, Production and Monetary Policy
n = 0.1 Size of the domestic economy
β = 0.99 Discount factor
σ = 1 Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
γ = 1 Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods
ϕ = 2 Frisch elasticity of labour supply
v = 0.35 Degree of openness
η = 0.35 Share of capital in production
λ = 11 Elasticity of substitution between domestic goods
δ = 0.025 Quarterly rate of depreciation

 = 0.01 Share of entrepreneurial labor
ΨI = 12 Investment adjustment cost
ΨD = 0.0075 Responsiveness of household risk premium to debt/GDP
Ψ = 120 Price adjustment costs
ǫπ = 1.5 Coe¢cient of CPI ination in the policy rule
ǫY = 0.5 Coe¢cient of output gap in the policy rule
ǫS = 0.5 Coe¢cient of exchange rate in the policy rule (Korea only)
ρ̺ = 0.5 Persistence of the perception shock
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                                                                                                                                                    Table 2. Business cycles in Korea and the US: Data vs. Model*
Output Investment Current account Inflation Interest rate Exchange rate (Dollar/Won)
Data/Model Data/Model Data/Model Data/Model Data/Model Data/Model
Korea 0.52/0.52 0.92/1.45 2.6/1.93 0.32/0.21 0.75/0.57 1.31/1.31
U.S. 0.56/0.56 1.87/1.59 0.35/0.72 0.23/0.16 1.94/0.43 1.31/1.31
ii) Standard deviation relative to output 
Output Investment Current account Inflation Interest rate Exchange rate (Dollar/Won)
Data/Model Data/Model Data/Model Data/Model Data/Model Data/Model
Korea 1.00/1.00 1.76/2.78 5.01/3.71 0.63/0.41 1.46/1.11 2.52/2.52
U.S. 1.00/1.00 3.36/2.84 0.64/1.28 0.41/0.76 3.48/0.76 2.35/2.34
iii) Correlation with output and autocorrelations
Ʊ,< Ʊ&$< Ʊ<W<W Ʊ,W,W Ʊ&$W&$W Ʊ6W6W
Data/Model Data/Model Data/Model Data/Model Data/Model Data/Model
Korea 0.67/0.88 -0.38/-0.65 0.74/0.74 0.49/0.63 0.52/0.73 0.67/0.67
U.S. 0.94/0.72 -0.55/0.43 0.89/0.89 0.93/0.55 0.89/0.57 0.67/0.67
iv) Cross-country correlations 
Ʊ<< Ʊ,, Ʊ,1),1) Ʊ,17,17
Data/Model Data/Model Data/Model Data/Model
Korea vs. U.S. 0.42/0.64 0.07/0.79 0.49/0.70 0.78/0.68
*Output and investment data moments are in percentage deviations from the HP filtered trend and their model moments are in percent deviations from
their steady state values. Current account is reported as a share of GDP in both data and in the model, and inflation and interest rates are in percentage 
terms. Model results are calculated as empirical moments for 10,000 periods following three types of shocks: financial shocks (1 percent for Korea and 
0.3 percent for the U.S.), productivity shocks (0.7 percent for Korea and 1.2 percent for the U.S.), and a shock to import prices (0.4 percent). 
Magnitude and persistency of the domestic and foreign productivity shocks and the terms of trade shock are set to match the volatility and persistency 
of domestic output, foreign output and exchange rate, respectively.  Data are from IMF's WEO and IFS databases for the priod Q1: 2000-Q4: 2014.
Output is represented by Y, I denotes investment, CA denotes the current account, S denotes the exchange rate, INF denotes inflation, and INT denotes interest rates. 
i) Standard deviation (in %)
Figure 1. Responses to a Financial Crisis 
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Note: The plots show the impact of a 1 % shock to the risk premium. The variables are presented as log-
deviations from the steady state, multiplied by 100 to have an interpretation of percentage deviations.  
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